We define a recursive theory which axomatizes a class of models of I∆ 0 + Ω 3 + ¬exp all of which share two features: firstly, the set of ∆ 0 definable elements of the model is majorized by the set of elements definable by ∆ 0 formulae of fixed complexity; secondly, Σ 1 truth about the model is recursively reducible to the set of true Σ 1 formulae of fixed complexity.
In the present paper, we define a consistent recursive theory T , implying I∆ 0 and inconsistent with I∆ 0 +exp, which has the following two properties:
1) in every model M |= T elements definable by ∆ 0 formulae of fixed quantifier complexity are cofinal among all ∆ 0 definable elements;
2) for every model M |= T , the set of Σ 1 sentences true in M is recursively reducible to the set of true Σ 1 sentences whose ∆ 0 part has fixed quantifier complexity.
Thus, T axiomatizes to some extent the phenomenon of the cofinality of elements definable by ∆ 0 formulae with fixed complexity among all ∆ 0 definable elements, and of the reducibility of the set of true Σ 1 sentences to the set of true Σ 1 sentences whose complexity is fixed.
¿From the logical point of view, the idea behind the construction of T seems to be interesting in itself. The axioms of T reduce the validity of a Π 1 sentence ψ to the validity a sentence expressing (roughly) a form of "consistency" of ψ. To show the consistency of T , we have to be able to build a model in which all "consistent" Π 1 sentences are true.
We construct such a model by iterating the following procedure: given a model M satisfying the "consistency" of the Π 1 sentence ψ 0 , we build another model M 0 satisfying ψ 0 , and still satisfying the "consistency" of ψ 0 . We then move on to the next Π 1 sentence, ψ 1 . To carry on the construction, we now must -if M 0 satisfies the "consistency" of ψ 1 -be able to construct another model M 1 satisfying ψ 1 , but still satisfying ψ 0 and the "consistency" of ψ 0 and ψ 1 . Etc.
Thus, we need our models have the property that "what is true is consistent". Moreover, this property has to be preserved under the iteration. Therefore, what we need is in fact the " "consistency" of the set of true Π 1 and Σ 1 sentences together with the "consistency" of the set of true Π 1 and Σ 1 sentences together with the "consistency" of the set of true Π 1 and Σ 1 sentences...". To make this formal, we have to define a kind of "selfreproducing consistency statement". This is subtle since we are very close to contradicting Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is preliminary. Section 2 discusses our basic technical tool: evaluations on sequences of terms. In section 3, we define our "self-reproducing consistency statement", and we argue that it is a kind of reflection principle. Finally, in section 4 we introduce the theory T and prove our main results.
Preliminaries
Some notational conventions:
The symbol log stands for the discrete-valued binary logarithm function; exp(x) is 2 x . Whenever f denotes a function, f (k) denotes f iterated k times. For a model M, log (k) (M) (the k-th logarithm of M) consists of those elements of M for which exp (k) exists. The variable i, possibly with indices, always ranges over elements of log (3) , and the variable j, possibly with indices, ranges over elements of log (4) . A "bar" (as in, say, "x") always denotes a tuple -depending on the context, it may happen that tuples of nonstandard length are also allowed.
We adopt the coding of sets and sequences in bounded arithmetic developed in [HP] . Also the notion of length lh(Λ) of a sequence Λ is the one defined in [HP] for bounded arithmetic. If Λ = t 1 , . . . , t l is a sequence of length l ∈ log(M), then functions from Λ into {0, 1} may be coded as subsets of size lh(Λ) of Λ × {0, 1} (see [S] ). We use a somewhat different coding, letting f : Λ −→ {0, 1} be represented by the pair Λ, p , where p is a function from {1, . . . , l} into {0, 1} -thus, an object of size exp(l) -with p(i) intended to code f (t i ). Whenever Λ is fixed, we may simply identify f with p.
Our base language L contains the individual constants 0, 1, and the relational symbols +, ≤, ×, | · |, # 2 , # 3 , and # 4 . The intuitive meaning of |x| = y is that y is the length of the binary representation of x (equal to log(x + 1) ). The # i 's are to stand for the graphs of the first three smash functions: x# 2 y = exp(|x| · |y|), x# n+1 y = exp(|x|# n |y|) for n ≥ 2. A hierarchy of functions related to the smash functions is defined by: ω 1 (x) = x |x| ; ω n+1 (x) = exp(ω n (|x|)). Note that for any n ≥ 1, ω n (x) is roughly x# n+1 x.
We assume that some appropriate Gödel numbering of L-formulae has been fixed; we shall identify the formulae with their Gödel numbers.
An L-formula ϕ is in negation normal form if no quantifiers in ϕ occur in the scope of a negation. ϕ is ∆ 0 if all the quantifiers in ϕ are bounded, i.e. of the form ∃x ≤ y. Σ 1 and Π 1 formulae are defined in the natural way.
For any natural number r, the class E r consists of ∆ 0 formulae in prenex normal form which contain (r − 1) alternations of quantifier blocks, starting with an existential block, and not counting sharply bounded quantifiers 1 . The class U r is defined dually. The class ∃ r consists of Σ 1 formulae of the form ∃xψ where ψ is U r−1 . The class ∀ r is defined dually.
We take I∆ 0 + Ω 3 to be the theory which consists of: a finite number of basic axioms relating the interpretations of the L-symbols to each other; the induction scheme for all ∆ 0 formulae; and an axiom stating that # 4 is a total function (note that this is equivalent to the totality of ω 3 ). I∆ 0 + Ω n , for i = 1, 2, is defined analogously. I∆ 0 states only the totality of + and ×. I∆ 0 + exp, on the other hand, additionally states the totality of the exp function.
I∆ * 0 is an auxiliary system which contains the basic axioms and the ∆ 0 induction scheme, but no axioms stating the totality of +, × etc. Thus, a model of I∆ * 0 may have a greatest element. Note that (under a reasonable choice of the basic axioms), all axioms of I∆ * 0 are Π 1 . One benefit of working with a relational language is that definining the relativization of a formula poses no difficulties. Namely, if ϕ is an L-formula, then ϕ x is defined inductively, with only the quantifier step non-trivial:
The language L T is an extension of L obtained by adding function symbols s ϕ for all L-formulae ϕ in negation normal form which begin with an existential quantifier. The intention is that the symbol s ϕ stands for a Skolem function for the first existential quantifier in ϕ. That is, given an L-formula ϕ(x) = ∃yψ(x, y) in negation normal form, s ϕ is a function symbol of arity 1 The notion of sharply bounded quantifier is an obvious variant of the one known from functional languages for bounded arithmetic, e.g. in ∀x∀y ≤ x∃z ≤ x((y = |x| ⇒ z = y) ∧ . . .) the quantifier ∀z is sharply bounded.
1 + lh(x), and s ϕ (t) is intended to be some y which satisfies ψ(t, y), if such a y exists.
Whenever we speak of a formula ϕ(t), it is assumed that ϕ(x) itself is an L-formula, although the termst do not have to be terms of L.
We have to encode the language L T in arithmetic. We use numbers divisible by 3 to enumerate terms of the form s ϕ (t), numbers congruent to 1 (mod 3) for a special enumeration of numerals, and numbers congruent to 2 (mod 3) to enumerate some additional terms. In more detail: we let the number 3 ϕ(x),t correspond to s ϕ (t); we let 3k + 1 correspond to a numeral for k (3k + 1 will be referred to as k); finally, we let 3k + 2 correspond to a special term s k (the role of the s k 's is explained by clause (v) of definition 2.3). We also code ϕ(t) by the ordered pair ϕ(x),t .
¿From now on, we identify the terms of L T with their numbers. The models M we work with are -unless explicitly stated or obvious from the context that this is not the case -assumed to be nonstandard countable models of I∆ 0 + Ω 3 .
We shall consider various sequences of closed terms. About such a sequence Λ we shall always assume that if a term of the form s ϕ (t) appears in Λ, then all terms int also do, and moreover, that they have smaller indices in Λ than s ϕ (t). Also, whenever dealing with a sequence Λ and a model M, we shall assume that lh(Λ) is in log(M).
Given a sequence of terms Λ, let the collection A(Λ) of atomic sentences over Λ consist of all sentences obtained by substituting terms from Λ for variables in atomic formulae of L. Observe that there is a standard polynomial π(n) such that lh(A(Λ)) ≤ π(lh(Λ)). Let us fix some such π. Some more notation: if F is a class of formulae, the symbol F(M) denotes the family of all F-definable elements of M, while M F denotes the set of F-sentences true in M.
Finally, let us recall some relevant facts about universal formulae. Firstly, in I∆ 0 + exp there is a Σ 1 universal formula Sat for ∆ 0 . Thus, Sat is Σ 1 , and for any M |= I∆ 0 + exp, ϕ ∈ M a ∆ 0 formula,
Secondly, in I∆ 0 + Ω 3 there is an ∃ r universal formula Sat r for ∃ r , for each r ∈ ω. Sat r can obviously be also used as a universal formula for E r , and additionally, if we limit our attention to the truth of E r formulae smaller than some a with parameters smaller than some b, then the initial existential quantifier in Sat r can also be bounded (thus giving an "E r formula with a parameter": call this formula Sat Er ).
Evaluations and evaluation models
Let p : A(Λ) −→ {0, 1} map every axiom of equality in A(Λ) to 1. We call such a p an evaluation on Λ, since we may think of p as assigning a logical value to sentences in A(Λ) (see also [A1] , [A2] , [A3] , [AZ1] , [AZ2] , [S] ). Of course, p can be uniquely extended to all boolean combinations of sentences in A(Λ) in the routine way.
Note in passing that any evaluation on Λ is an object of size at most exp(lh(A(Λ))) and thus at most exp(π(lh(Λ))).
For ϕ(x) in negation normal form,t ∈ Λ, we define the notion that Λ is good enough (g.e.) for ϕ,t by induction on ϕ. Λ is always g.e. for ϕ,t if ϕ is open. Λ is g.e. for ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ,t iff it is g.e. for ϕ 1 ,t and ϕ 2 ,t , similarly for conjunctions. If ϕ is ∃yϕ (x, y), then Λ is g.e. for ϕ,t if s ϕ (t) ∈ Λ and Λ is g.e. for ϕ ,t s ϕ (t) . Finally, if ϕ is ∀yφ(x, y), then Λ is g.e. for ϕ,t if s ∃y¬φ(x,y) (t) ∈ Λ (where ∃y¬φ is the normal form of ¬ϕ) and Λ is g.e. for φ,t s ∃y¬φ(x,y) (t) .
The idea is that Λ is g.e. for ϕ,t if it contains enough appropriate Skolem terms so that assigning a logical value to ϕ(t) based on an evaluation on Λ makes sense.
Definition 2.1 Lett ∈ Λ. We define the relation p |= ϕ(t) for ϕ(x) in negation normal form by induction:
(ii) the relation p |= ϕ behaves in the natural way with respect to conjunctions and disjunctions;
(iii) if ϕ is ∃yϕ (x, y), then p |= ϕ(t) iff Λ is g.e. for ϕ,t and p |= ϕ (t, s ϕ (t)),
We will be especially interested in the case where Λ is one of a number of canonical sequences of terms. To define these, let K(i) be the unique function satisfying K(0) = 1 and K(i + 1) = c · exp(i) · K(i) i , where c is an appropriately large standard integer. Note that for any i, K(i) ∈ log, as for almost all i, K(i) ≤ exp(i i ), and i i is always in log (2) , since we have:
is closed under multiplication, and log (4) is closed under addition.
The notion of canonical sequence of rank i, Λ i , is now defined by induction. Λ i+1 is the smallest sequence Λ such that:
• for any j ≤ i + 1, Λ contains the term s j and is good for exp (3) (x) = y, j s j ;
• for any a ≤ K(i), Λ contains the numeral a, and if exp(a) ≤ exp (3) (i + 1), then Λ is g.e. for ∃exp(x), a ;
• for any formula ϕ < exp(i) of the form ψ t or ∃x ≤ t ψ x (where t ∈ Λ i ), and anyt ∈ Λ i , Λ is g.e. for ϕ,t .
Observe that if c is chosen large enough, then lh(Λ i ) ≤ K(i) for all i (since a formula smaller than exp(i) contains at most i quantifiers).
Some particularly well-behaved evaluations on Λ i will be called evaluations of rank i (we let A i stand for A(Λ i )):
is called an evaluation of rank i if the following holds:
(ii) if ϕ < exp(i) is an axiom of I∆ * 0 , then assuming Λ i is g.e. for ϕ, ∅ , p |= ϕ;
(iii) p |= (0 = 0 ∧ 1 = 1), and given any a, b ∈ Λ i : if a + b ∈ Λ i , then p |= (a + b = a + b), and similarly for the other symbols of L;
(iv) for all a ∈ Λ i such that exp(a) ≤ exp (3) (i + 1), p |= ∃exp(a);
We let "p ∈ E i " stand for "p is an evaluation of rank i". This is a slight abuse of notation, since the code for the set of evaluations of rank i might be too large to be an element of the model.
We claim that both "p |= ϕ" (for p an evaluation on Λ i ) and "p ∈ E i " are ∆ 0 definable with an appropriately large parameter (and thus ∆ 1 definable).
To see whether an evaluation p on Λ i sets ϕ to "True" (i.e. whether p |= ϕ), we need to deal with sets V 0 , . . . , V r , where where V l is the set of values given by p to the l-th subformula of ϕ under all relevant substitutions of terms in Λ i for the free variables in that subformula. Since there are at most log ϕ variables in any subformula of ϕ, the number of possible substitutions is not greater than K(i) log ϕ , and hence V l ≤ exp(K(i) log ϕ ). Again, there can be no more than log ϕ subformulae of ϕ. Thus, the sequence V 0 , . . . , V r is at most log ϕ-long, so its code is at most exp(log ϕ · K(i) log ϕ ). This is the largest object relevant to the truth value given to ϕ by ψ, which shows that "p |= ϕ" is indeed ∆ 0 definable with a parameter.
To see whether an evaluation p on Λ i is in E i , we have to check what truth value it assigns to a number of formulae ϕ smaller than exp(i). With some additional work, one may verify that all objects we need to consider are smaller than ω 3 (exp (3) i), which implies that also "p ∈ E i " is ∆ 0 definable with a parameter.
We let T rue(p, i, ϕ) be a ∆ 1 formula which says "p ∈ E i and p |= ϕ".
The following proposition lists some "conservativity" relationships between evaluations one of which extends the other. The proofs are simple inductive arguments.
Proposition 2.5 Let p 2 ∈ E i 2 extend p 1 ∈ E i 1 . Then:
Another simple fact about evaluations is:
The importance of evaluations consists in the fact that they make possible the construction of models for I∆ 0 + Ω 3 . More precisely, such a model is determined by an ascending chain of evaluations whose ranks are cofinal in log (3) (note that by remark 2.2, in a model of I∆ 0 + Ω 3 the third logarithm has no last element).
Let P = p n : n ∈ ω be such a chain. Ift is a tuple of terms of L T and ϕ(t) is open, then almost all p n 's agree on the logical value of ϕ(t). So, we may define P |= ϕ(t) by: p n |= ϕ(t) for almost all n.
We define the relation = P between terms in L T by:
Since the p n 's are evaluations, = P is an equivalence relation and a congruence with respect to the relations of L. Let M 0 [P ] be the model whose universe is the set of = P -equivalence classes and whose relations are defined by
Clearly, we have:
for any open ϕ. If we introduce the more general relation P |= ϕ(t), for ϕ not necessarily open, by the same clause as above, then induction yields
The converse implication will not generally hold unless we accept a more restrictive definition of evaluation which is not needed here.
The next lemma and corollary show that the numeral a may be treated as a name for the a-th element of M 0 [P ] .
Moreover, if ϕ is an open formula andā is a tuple of numerals for numbers less or equal to K(i − 1), then ϕ(ā) implies p |= ϕ(ā).
Proof. We may assume that our formalization of I∆ * 0 contains axioms such as:
, ∀x∀y((x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1) and similar axioms for the other symbols of L.
The first part of the lemma is proved by induction on a ≤ K(i − 1). For a = 0, p |= (0 = 0), so p |= (t ≤ 0) implies p |= (t ≤ 0), hence p |= (t = 0) by the appropriate axiom, hence p |= (t = 0). Assume that the thesis holds for a and that p |= (t ≤ a + 1). Then, since p |= (a + 1 = a + 1), we get either p |= (t = a + 1) or p |= (t ≤ a), in which case we use the inductive assumption to get p |= (t = b) for some b ≤ a.
For the "moreover" part, first prove p |= (a 1 + a 2 = a 1 + a 2 ) (assuming a 1 + a 2 ≤ K(i − 1)) by induction, using appropriate axioms for the induction base and induction step. Then proceed similarly with p |= (a 1 · a 2 = a 1 · a 2 ) (again, assuming i is large enough) and the remaining symbols of L, and pass through boolean combinations to obtain the thesis.
Corollary 2.8 The mapping a → [a] (for a ∈ log(M) is an isomorphism between log(M) and an initial segment I of M 0 [P ] Proof. It suffices to observe that if P = P n : n ∈ ω where p n ∈ E in , then for any tupleā ∈ log, the maximal element ofā is smaller than K(i n − 1) for almost all n, so we may apply lemma 2.7.
By clause (iv) of definition 2.3, I ⊆ log(M 0 [P ] ). Let M[P ] be the initial segment of M 0 [P ] generated by exp(I). If we identify I with log(M), we obtain:
We also have:
We close this section with a theorem on evaluation models (i.e. models of the form M [P ] ) which will play a key role later on.
Theorem 2.11 Let M be a countable model of I∆ 0 + Ω 3 + BΣ 1 . Assume that F is a set of standard L-formulae,
and is a subset of a set
Then there exists an increasing and cofinal sequence P = p n : n ∈ ω of evaluations such that P |= ϕ(l 1 , . . . , l r ) for each ϕ ∈ F, l 1 , . . . , l r ∈ log (3+k) (M), and the model M [P ] satisfies I∆ 0 + Ω 3 .
In particular, for any n such that θ n is Π 1 , M[P ] |= θ n (l 1 , . . . , l r ), for each l 1 , . . . , l r ∈ log (3+k) (M), n ∈ ω.
Proof. Let us introduce the following convention: every evaluation p of rank i appearing in this proof satisfies p |= θ l (l 1 , . . . , l r ) for all l, l 1 , . . . , l r < log (k) i.
Let i 1 < i 2 < . . . be cofinal in log (3) (M). We shall define a sequence P = p n : n ∈ ω such that p n ∈ E in .
P is defined by induction as follows. Suppose that at a given step n we already have evaluations p 1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ p n such that p 1 ∈ E i 1 , . . . , p n ∈ E in satisfying the inductive condition ( * ) ∀i > i n ∃p ∈ E i p n ⊆ p .
Note that at the initial step the validity of the inductive condition is ensured by the assumption of the theorem.
We claim that it follows by BΣ 1 that:
Indeed, assume ( * * ) fails. Then for anyp ∈ E i n+1 extending p n there exists i(p) > i n+1 for which there is no evaluation p ∈ E i extendingp. Now, allp's are bounded by exp(π(K(i n+1 )). Thus, we may use BΣ 1 to find a common bound i for all the i(p)'s. It follows that there is no p ∈ E i extending any of the i(p)'s. On the other hand, by ( * ) there is some p ∈ E i extending p n . But (p A i n+1 ) ∈ E i n+1 , and p n ⊆ (p A i n+1 ) ⊆ p, a contradiction. Hence, ( * * ) must hold and the claim is proved.
Finally, the evaluation p n+1 given by ( * * ) satisfies the inductive condition at stage n + 1. Now let P = p n : n ∈ ω . Obviously P is increasing and cofinal. Since all the axioms of I∆ * 0 are Π 1 we infer from corollary 2.10 that M[P ] |= I∆ * 0 . On the other hand, the set {exp (3) i : i ∈ log (3) M} is cofinal in both M and M[P ] (cf. corollary 2.9). Since M |= Ω 3 , we infer in view of corollary 2.9 that M [P ] |= Ω 3 . Consequently, M[P ] |= I∆ 0 + Ω 3 since obviously I∆ * 0 +Ω 3 implies I∆ 0 +Ω 3 . This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 2.12 To keep the enunciation of the above theorem reasonably concise, we have formulated its assumptions in a relatively simple way. It is clear, however, that appropriate variants of the theorem would also be true if the assumptions were modified in one or more of the following ways:
• in (#), ∀i∃p ∈ E i (. . .) could be replaced by ∀ ∞ i∃p ∈ E i (. . .);
• also in (#), ∀l, l 1 , . . . , l r < log (k) i could be replaced by ∀l, l 1 , . . . , l r < (log (k) i)/r (for any standard r), as long as log (3+k) is closed under addition;
• F could be extended by adding finitely many formulae of the form ϕ(t) evaluated to "True" by almost all of the p's given by (#).
In the sequel, we will sometimes speak of using "theorem 2.11" when some such variant is actually meant.
The principle τ
The present section introduces a consistent sentence τ which is a kind of reflection principle (mentioned in the title). We begin by formulating some preservation properties of evaluations.
For a Σ 1 sentence Φ of the form ∃xφ x let Γ Φ (p, i) be the formula
and, for a fixed sufficiently large m which depends on some further constructions but could be specified in advance, let Γ m (p, i) be the formula ∀ψ < i, ψ ∈ ∃ m ∀j ≤ i ∀a 1 , . . . , a r ∈ Λ i Sat m (ψ exp (3) j (a 1 , . . . , a r )) ⇒ T rue(p, i, ψ s j (a 1 , . . . , a r ) .
Intuitively, Γ Φ (p, i) says "p preserves the size of a witness for Φ = ∃xφ x , and disallows witnesses of size greater than exp (3) i", while Γ m (p, i) says "p preserves the restrictions ψ exp (3) j , for j ≤ i, of all ∃ m sentences smaller than i".
Arguments similar to those in the previous section show that both Γ Φ and Γ m are ∆ 0 with a parameter (and hence ∆ 1 ), as they make no reference to objects greater than ω 3 (exp (3) i).
We will now define some (possibly non-standard) sentences τ j,j 1 for j, j 1 ∈ log (4) . The definition is by induction on j 1 . Let τ j,0 be:
, and let τ j,j 1 +1 be:
.
If the definition of τ j,j 1 is to make sense, an evaluation of rank exp j 1 should be able to decide the truth value of τ l,l 1 for l, l 1 < j 1 /2. To check that this is so, let ϕ j,j 1 (z,x) stand for
, andt j 1 stand for τ l,l 1 : l, l 1 < (j 1 /2) .
Observe that for τ j,j 1 is ϕ j,j 1 (j 1 ,t j 1 ). Therefore, it is enough to check that for any j 1 , ϕ j 1 /2,j 1 /2 is smaller than exp(exp(j 1 )−1) and thatt j 1 /2 ∈ Λ exp(j 1 )−1 .
To see the former, note that given any j 1 a code for ϕ j 1 ,j 1 is about j j 2 1 1 , which is smaller than ω 1 (exp j 1 ) (a precise bound on ϕ j 1 ,j 1 depends on the details of how we code the syntax, esp. the variables, but the main ingredient of ϕ j 1 ,j 1 is a (j 2 1 /4)-long conjunction of formulae whose codes will not greatly exceed the code for the (j 2 1 /4)-th variable, which in turn may be around j 2 1 ). So for us it suffices if ω 1 (exp(j 1 /2)) is smaller than exp(exp(j 1 ) − 1), which is clearly always the case.
To see the latter, we only need to check that for all j 1 , τ j 1 /4,j 1 /4 is smaller than K(exp(j 1 ) − 1). But for any j 1 , the size of τ j 1 ,j 1 can be bounded by roughly ω 1 (exp j 1 ) (the code for ϕ j 1 ,j 1 ) times the code for the (j 2 1 /4)-long sequence of the τ l,l 1 's (for l, l 1 < j 1 /2). This sequence will have a code smaller than (3 · τ j 1 /2,j 1 /2 ) j 2 1 /4 . Using the fact that K(i + 1) > cK(i) i for some large standard c, it is easy to verify that K(exp(j 1 ) − 1) is more than τ j 1 ,j 1 (not to mention τ j 1 /4,j 1 /4 ).
In addition to the τ j,j 1 's we also define, for any j ∈ log (4) , a formula τ j (j 1 ) with j 1 as a free variable. τ j (j 1 ) is:
, where x = τ l,l 1 is an abbreviation for the inductive definition of τ l,l 1 with l and l 1 as parameters. Note that although the τ j (·)'s are in general again non-standard, τ n (·) is a standard formula for any standard n.
Note also that exp (4) (2j 1 ) is not less than ω 3 (exp (4) j 1 ) -the greatest element we possibly need to access in order to check whether a given p ∈ E exp j 1 satisfies all the conditions required in τ j,j 1 or τ j (j 1 ) (as long as j is not unreasonably large in comparison to j 1 ). For this reason, the relativization to exp (4) (2j 1 ), which is necessary for technical reasons, does not essentially influence the sense of τ j,j 1 or τ j (j 1 ).
Let ψ j (z) stand for
, where x = τ l,l 1 is an abbreviation for the inductive definition of τ l,l 1 . The following lemma establishes an important connection between τ j,j 1 and τ j (j 1 ).
Lemma 3.1 Let j ≤ j 1 and let i be such that:
• The formulae x = τ l,l 1 (as a formula of x, l, l 1 ) and T rue(y, exp z, x) may be bounded by exp (3) (i/2) for any choice of l, l 1 < j 1 /2, z < j 1 , y < exp(π(K(exp j 1 ))), and x < K(exp j 1 ) exp j 1 ;
• Λ i is g.e. for ϕ j,j 1 , j 1 t j 1 and for ψ j,j 1 , j 1 .
Let p ∈ E i satisfy Γ m (p, i).
Then M |= T rue(p, i, τ j,j 1 ) iff M |= T rue(p, i, τ j (j 1 )) Remark 3.2 Any i ≥ exp(2j 1 ) satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
Proof. We prove the left-to-right direction as the other direction is very similar. Assume M |= T rue(p, i, τ j,j 1 ). As already noted, τ j,j 1 is ϕ j,j 1 (j 1 ,t j 1 ). So, by the definition of τ j,j 1 and the meaning of the formula T rue, it follows that for all l, l 1 < j 1 /2, p |= T rue(s ϕ j,j 1 (j 1 t j 1 ), exp j 1 , τ l,l 1 ).
We may assume that m was chosen large enough so that the formula x = τ l,l 1 is ∃ m . Then, by our assumptions on the size of i, we may use the fact that p satisfies Γ m to get p |= (τ l,l 1 = τ l,l 1 ) for all l, l 1 < j 1 /2. Thus, for every t such that p |= (t = τ l,l 1 ), we also have p |= (t = τ l,l 1 ). By definition 2.1, this means that p |= ∀x(x = τ l,l 1 ⇒ T rue(s ϕ j,j 1 (j 1 t j 1 ), exp j 1 , x)) for any choice of l, l 1 < j 1 /2.
Similarly, for every t such that p |= (t < j 1 /2), we also have p |= (t = l) for some l < j 1 /2. Therefore, we get p |= ∀l, l 1 < j 1 /2 ∀x(x = τ l,l 1 ⇒ T rue(s ϕ j,j 1 (j 1 t j 1 ), exp j 1 , x)).
Combining this with the original assumption that M |= T rue(p, i, τ j,j 1 ), we obtain:
To prove M |= T rue(p, i, τ j (j 1 )), we only need to check that p also evaluates the above formula to "True" if we substitute the appropriate Skolem term for s ϕ j,j 1 (j 1 t j 1 ). If that was not the case, we would have neither p |= τ j (j 1 ) nor p |= ¬τ j (j 1 ) (since we have a witness for the initial existential quantifier in τ j (j 1 )). But p |= (s exp 2j 1 = exp (4) (2j 1 )), so p treats τ j (j 1 ) as a formula relativized to s exp 2j 1 . Now, p ∈ E i , and thus it follows from part (i) of definition 2.3 that at least one of p |= τ j (j 1 ) and p |= ¬τ j (j 1 ) must hold.
Corollary 3.3 Let j ≤ j 1 . Then M |= ∀i (Λ i g.e. for ϕ j,j 1 , j 1 t j 1 ⇒ ∃p ∈ E i T rue(p, i, τ j,j 1 )) iff M |= ∀i (Λ i g.e. for ψ j , j 1 ⇒ ∃p ∈ E i T rue(p, i, τ j (j 1 )).
Proof. Follows from the lemma via propositions 2.5 and 2.6.
We now let τ be ∀j∀j 1 Sat(τ j (j 1 )). In view of lemma 3.1, the sentence τ can be treated as a form of reflection principle (an observation due to A. Blass). Indeed, a "Π 1 reflection principle" is usually understood to be a formalized version of the principle ( * ) ψ is provable ⇒ ψ is true, for ψ ∈ Π 1 , in other words, ( * * ) φ is true ⇒ φ is consistent, for φ ∈ Σ 1 . Now, the existence of evaluations which satisfy φ is a kind of consistency of φ. So, in any model in which Sat is well-behaved as a truth definition, τ says:
φ is true ⇒ φ plus a restricted fragment of τ is consistent, for φ ∈ Σ 1 . Thus, τ expresses ( * * ) and additionally has a limited "selfreproducing" property.
As remarked above, τ is a consistent sentence. Even more:
Theorem 3.4 The theory I∆ 0 + exp proves τ .
Proof. Let us work in a model of I∆ 0 + exp. We prove ∀j ≤ j 1 Sat(τ j (j 1 )) by induction on j 1 . Assume ∀j ≤ j 1 Sat(τ j (j 1 )). We want to show ∀j ≤ j 1 + 1 Sat(τ j (j 1 )). Thus, given any j ≤ j 1 + 1, we need
We will find an evaluation p of rank j 1 + 1 such that ( * ) Γ m (p, exp(j 1 + 1)) ∧ Φ≤j Γ Φ (p, exp(j 1 + 1)) ∧ ∀l, l 1 < ((j 1 + 1)/2) (T rue(p, exp(j 1 + 1), τ l (l 1 )).
The fact that p is as required in τ j (j 1 + 1) will then follow from lemma 3.1, since exp(j 1 + 1) is a large enough rank for the lemma to ensure the equivalence of p |= τ l,l 1 and p |= τ l (l 1 ) for l ≤ l 1 < (j 1 + 1)/2 (see remark 3.2).
The way to obtain p is by constructing a Skolem hull on Λ exp(j 1 +1) . A Skolem hull on a given Λ is a sequence H = h t : t ∈ Λ of elements of M , where the element h t is thought of as an interpretation of the term t. One may define the satisfaction relation H |= ϕ(t) in much the same way as p |= ϕ(t), i.e. by postulating
for ϕ open, and then proceeding as in definition 2.1, so that e.g.
• H |= ∃yϕ (t, y) iff Λ i is g.e. for ∃yϕ (x, y),t and H |= ϕ (h t , h s ϕ (t) ).
It is clear that any hull H on Λ determines an evaluation p H such that p H |= ϕ iff H |= ϕ. If Λ is Λ i , and H is a hull of rank i (defined analogously to "evaluation of rank i", cf. def. 2.3), then p H ∈ E i .
The hull we want to construct on Λ exp(j 1 +1) is to satisfy:
(i) for any h ∈ H, h ≤ exp (4) (j 1 + 1), (ii) for any a ≤ K(exp j 1 ), h a = a, and for any j ≤ exp(j 1 + 1), h s j = exp (3) j ;
(iii) for any h t ∈ H and for any formula of the form ψ t smaller than exp(exp(j 1 + 1) − 1), (H |= ψ t ) iff Sat(ψ ht );
(iv) for any h t ∈ H and for any formula of the form ∃x ≤ t ψ x smaller than exp(exp(j 1 + 1) − 1),
(v) for every ϕ < exp(j 1 + 1),
if Sat(∀x ≤ exp (4) (j 1 + 1)¬φ x ) then H |= ∀x¬ϕ x .
The actual construction of H is based on a straightforward induction. Given that Λ exp(j 1 +1) is ordered as t 1 , . . . , t k , we assign interpretations to the t r 's by induction on r ≤ k. If t r+1 is a, then h t r+1 = a, if it is s j , then h t r+1 = exp (3) j . If t r+1 = s ϕ (t), then we define h t r+1 to be the smallest witness below exp (4) (j 1 + 1) for ϕ(h t ) whenever it exists, and arbitrary (but smaller than exp (4) (j 1 + 1)) if there is no such witness.
We take p to be p H . It is again straightforward to check that p ∈ E exp(j 1 +1) and that p has all the properties required in ( * ). In particular, ∀l, l 1 < ((j 1 + 1)/2)(T rue(p, exp(j 1 + 1), τ l (l 1 )) follows by the construction of p from the inductive assumption ∀j ≤ j 1 Sat(τ j (j 1 )).
The main theorem
To define the theory T mentioned in the introduction, we will use "finite fragments" of the principle τ . Namely, let τ n denote
. Thus, using the notation of the previous section, τ n is (approximately) ∀j 1 τ n (j 1 ). In particular, for n ∈ ω, τ n is a standard Π 1 sentence.
Lemma 4.1 Any ∃ m sentence χ consistent with I∆ 0 + Ω 3 is consistent with all the τ n 's.
Proof.
Let M |= I∆ 0 + Ω 3 + τ 0 + χ. W.l.o.g. we may assume that M |= BΣ 1 , since (cf. e.g. [P] ) M has a 1-elementary extension M of the same height satisfying BΣ 1 .
Let F be the set
This is a subset of
Using the fact that M |= τ 0 , we infer from (a minor variant of) corollary 3.3 that:
∀i ∃p ∈ E i ∀l, j 1 < (log i)/2 p |= τ l (j 1 ), since Λ i is g.e. for ψ l , j 1 whenever l, j 1 < (log i)/2. Also, almost all the p's evaluate χ to "True", because all p's given by τ 0 satisfy Γ m , and there is an i such that a witness for χ exists below exp (3) i. Since log (4) is closed under addition, we may apply theorem 2.11 and obtain an increasing and cofinal sequence P 0 of evaluations such that: M[P 0 ] |= I∆ 0 + Ω 3 , P 0 |= χ, and P 0 |= τ n (l 1 ) for any n ∈ ω, j 1 ∈ log (4) (M). Since the τ n (·)'s are Π 1 , it holds that M[P 0 ] |= τ n (j 1 ) for any n and j 1 .
But this means that for any n, j 1 ,
We may obtain suitable p's in E i for i not of the form exp j 1 by restricting the evaluations we have in E exp j 1 (use propositions 2.6 and 2.5 to ensure that these restrictions are indeed evaluations of the appropriate ranks and that they have the desired properties). Hence, for any n it holds in M [P 0 
which implies that M |= τ n for all n. It remains to point out that M[P 0 ] also satisfies χ, since P 0 |= χ and we may in this context treat χ as a ∆ 0 formula by considering its relativization to the smallest witness for χ.
Observe that the construction described in the proof of the lemma would have also worked if we started in a model of some higher τ N , and not just τ 0 . In that case, we would be able to replace the set F by a set which additionally contains ¬Φ, for all Φ ≤ N false in M, and suitable true relativizations of Φ, for Φ ≤ N true in M. Theorem 2.11 would then give us a sequence P N corresponding to that set. M[P N ] would satisfy all the τ n 's and χ just as M[P 0 ] did, but it would additionally satisfy exactly those Φ ≤ N which are true in M.
Given any Π 1 consequence θ of I∆ 0 +exp, there exists a purely existential sentence ϕ θ consistent with I∆ 0 + Ω 3 + BΣ 1 + θ, but inconsistent with I∆ 0 + exp (see [HP] ). If we apply this result to θ := τ 0 , we obtain an ∃ m sentence χ consistent with I∆ 0 + Ω 3 + BΣ 1 + {τ n : n ∈ ω}, but inconsistent with I∆ 0 + exp. Let us fix such a χ and define the theory T 0 by T 0 := I∆ 0 + Ω 3 + BΣ 1 + {τ n : n ∈ ω} + χ.
In the sequel will denote a binary sequence, = 0 , . . . , lh( )−1 . Given a fixed ∆ 0 enumeration ϕ n : n ∈ ω of all Σ 1 sentences, let us introduce the sentences σ n, : σ n, := (n = lh( ))
Lemma 4.2 Assuming m is sufficiently large, for any n and , σ n, is (equivalent in I∆ 0 + Ω 3 to) a ∀ m sentence.
Proof. The only difficulty is to show that ∀i∃p ∈ E i Γ m (p, i) can be equivalently written as a ∀ m formula. ∀i∃p ∈ E i Γ m (p, i) is: (a 1 , . . . , a r )) ⇒ T rue(p, i, ψ s j (a 1 , . . . , a r ) , so the main problem is that an implication with the ∃ m precedent Sat m occurs in the scope of the bounded existential quantifier ∃p. Actually, we could clearly replace Sat m by its E m analogue Sat Em (see the Preliminaries), but this still does not solve our problem.
By the definition of ∃ m , an ∃ m formula ψ(a 1 , . . . , a r ) is ∃xψ (a 1 , . . . , a r , x) for ψ ∈ U m−1 . Thus ψ exp (3) j (a 1 , . . . , a r ) holds iff there is a witness x ≤ exp (3) j such that ψ (a 1 , . . . , a r , x).
Consider the sentence ξ m
where x j,ψ,ā should be thought of as a sequence of "potential witnesses" smaller than exp (3) j for ψ(ā), and Sat U m−1 is dual to Sat E m−1 .
ξ m is easily seen to be equivalent to a ∀ m sentence. Indeed: Sat U m−1 is U m−1 with an appropriately large parameter, so it is E m−1 in the precedent of an implication; the universal quantifiers for j, ψ, andā may be treated as sharply bounded (in particular,ā is an at most log ψ-long sequence of objects smaller than 3K(i − 1), so it is ≤ (3K(i − 1)) log i ∈ log); and the initial unbounded universal quantifiers may obviously be merged into one.
Moreover, ξ m is also equivalent to ∀i∃p ∈ E i Γ m (p, i). The right-to-left direction is trivial: for any i the p ∈ E i satisfying Γ(p, i) will be good for all sequences of witnesses. For the other direction, given a fixed i, there is always an "optimal" sequence of witnesses x j,ψ,ā , i.e. one such that if there is any x ≤ exp (3) j for which ψ (a 1 , . . . , a r , x) holds, then x j,ψ,ā is such an x. Now, ξ m gives us a p ∈ E i which works for this "optimal" sequence. One easily checks that p must satisfy Γ m (p, i).
We also introduce the sentences Ψ n , for n ∈ ω:
Finally, we define our theory T by:
Obviously, T is a recursive theory. We will now prove our main theorem, which shows, among others, that T axiomatizes a certain class of models of T 0 in which the set of elements definable by ∆ 0 formulae of restricted complexity is cofinal in the set of all ∆ 0 definable elements: (c) In any (not necessarily countable)
Proof. We first prove (a). The proof is an inductive construction based on repeated application of theorem 2.11.
In the initial step, take an arbitrary countable model M of T 0 . Consider σ 0 = σ 0,∅ and put
where P 0 is as in theorem 2.11 for k = 1 and F 0 defined as
where χ should be treated as a relativization of the original χ to some exp (3) (·) true in M (note that the existence of P 0 follows from the fact that M |= σ 0 via theorem 2.11 and lemma 3.1). Also let 0 = 0 in the former and 0 = 1 in the latter case. M 0 clearly satisfies I∆ 0 + Ω 3 and {τ n : n ∈ ω} + χ (either by our assumptions on M or by the choice of F 0 ). Furthermore, by lemma 2.10, M |= σ 0 implies M[P 0 ] |= ¬φ 0 . On the other hand, in all models of {τ n : n ∈ ω}, ¬φ 0 implies σ 0 , because of the validity of a suitable τ N . Hence either 0 = 0 and M 0 |= ¬φ 0 or ε 0 = 1 and M 0 |= φ 0 ∧ ¬σ 0 . In other words, M 0 |= Ψ 0 . Thus, we always have M 0 |= (T 0 \ BΣ 1 ) + Ψ 0 . By passing to a 1-elementary extension of the same height if necessary (see the beginning of the proof of lemma 4.1), we may obtain a model M 0 satisfying T 0 + Ψ 0 .
Proceeding inductively, assume that we are given a model M n satisfying T 0 + Ψ n . Similarly as in the initial step, consider σ n+1 = σ n+1, for the sequence = 0 , . . . , n determined uniquely in view of M n |= Ψ n . Put
where P n+1 is as in theorem 2.11 for k = 1 and F n+1 defined as {τ n (x) : n ∈ ω} ∪ {¬φ r : r ≤ n, r = 0} ∪ {¬σ r,( r) : r ≤ n, r = 1} ∪ {¬φ n+1 } ∪ {χ}, where χ and the ¬σ's should again be treated as true relativizations to some exp (3) (·) (note as previously that the existence of P n+1 follows from M n |= σ n+1 via theorem 2.11 and lemma 3.1). Define n+1 = 0 in the former and n+1 = 1 in the latter case.
Again, it is clear that M n+1 satisfies I∆ 0 + Ω 3 and {τ n : n ∈ ω} + χ. As in the initial step, we get either n+1 = 0 and M n+1 |= ¬φ n+1 or n+1 = 1 and M n+1 |= φ n+1 ∧ ¬σ n+1 . We now check that M n+1 |= Ψ n+1 . This is obvious if n+1 = 1, so assume n+1 = 0 and thus M n+1 = M n [P n+1 ]. For a given r ≤ n, if r = 0, then M n+1 |= ¬φ r as required, since P n+1 |= ¬φ k . On the other hand, if r = 1, then M n+1 |= ¬σ r,( r) , since P n+1 sets a suitable relativization of ¬σ r,( r) to "True". But this also means M n+1 |= φ r , as ¬φ r would imply σ r,( r) in view of a suitable τ N . Thus, in either case, M n+1 |= Ψ n+1 .
As before, we may pass to a 1-elementary extension if necessary to get a model M n+1 satisfying T 0 + Ψ n . Since Ψ n clearly implies Ψ k for k < n, this shows that every finite subtheory of T is consistent. By compactness, T itself is also consistent, which ends the proof of (a).
To prove (b), let M be an arbitrary model of T . Let the infinite binary sequence be the unique extension of the sequences given by the Ψ n 's. Then for each n ∈ ω we have ( * ) M |= φ n ≡ ¬σ n,(ε n) .
For, just as in the proof of (a), ¬φ n implies σ n,( n) since M |= {τ n : n ∈ ω}, while φ n yields n = 1, whence we have ¬σ n,( n) because of Ψ n . ¿From ( * ) we obtain a recursive reduction of Σ 1 truth about M to ∃ m truth about M. Indeed, knowing ( n) and knowing whether σ n,( n) is true we deduce whether φ n is true, whence we deduce ( n + 1) and so on: we recover the Σ 1 truth from the ∀ m truth step by step.
For a proof of (c), suppose that a ∈ ∆ 0 (M). In other words, M |= ϕ(a), where ϕ(x) ∈ ∆ 0 and M |= ∃!xϕ x (x). Thus, ∃xϕ x (x) is a Σ 1 sentence, say φ n , true in M. Let i be such that exp (3) i < a, so that we have M |= ¬∃x < exp (3) i ϕ x (x). Using an appropriate τ N (recall that M |= {τ n : n ∈ ω}), we can find a p ∈ E i such that in M we have: Γ m (p, i) ∧ ∀l, l 1 < (log i)/2∀x(x = τ l,l 1 ⇒ T rue(p, i, x)) ∧ r<n r = 0 ⇒ p |= ¬φ r ∧ p |= ¬φ n ,
where is the sequence given by Ψ n . Hence M |=σ n, (i), whereσ n, is obtained from σ n, (the standard version, not necessarily the one discussed in lemma 4.2) by deleting the universal quantifier ∀i.
We have proved that for any i, ¬∃x < exp (3) i ϕ x (x) impliesσ n, (i). However, we have M |= ¬σ n, since M |= φ n . It follows from ¬σ n, that there exists a number i 0 such that M |= ¬σ n, (i 0 ).
Let b 0 be exp (4) (2 · log i 0 ) (thus, b 0 is large enough to be a bound for all the quantifiers inσ n, (i 0 )), and let b > b 0 be the smallest element of M which is large enough to be a bound for all the quantifiers in b 0 = exp (4) (2 · log i 0 ). Now, b is the smallest element satisfying the E m+1 formula ∃i 0 < b ∃b 0 < b (b 0 = exp (4) (2 · log i 0 )) b ∧ ¬(σ n, (i 0 )) b 0 , so it is definable in M by an E m+1 ∧ U m+1 formula. Furthermore, b > a. This proves that (c) holds.
We conclude this paper with a remark on Σ 1 -definability of N in models of I∆ 0 + Ω 1 -more precisely, on its relation to the question whether elements definable by Σ 1 formulae of some fixed complexity are cofinal in a given model.
Let M |= I∆ 0 + Ω 1 and assume that the set ∃ r (M) is cofinal in M. We claim that if M ∃r has a code a ∈ M, then N is Σ 1 definable in M with a as a parameter. For, given an enumeration ϕ n : n ∈ N of ∃ r sentences, let ψ(x) be the formula ∃y∀z < x ϕ z ∈ a ⇒ Sat y r (ϕ z ) . Clearly, it follows from the cofinality of ∃ r (M) that ψ(x) defines N in M.
We have thus proved one half of the following proposition (the other follows easily by a standard argument):
Proposition 4.4 Assume that N is not Σ 1 definable (with parameters) in M. Then for any r: ∃ r (M) is cofinal in M iff ∃ r truth is not codable in M.
